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A particularly interesting incident, that of the seizure of the *Presidente Mitre*, may be found under "Argentina". The vessel was under the Argentine flag but was owned by a German company. Because the *Presidente Mitre* was engaged entirely in the coasting trade of Argentina the republic argued that the seizure would constitute an interference with its internal affairs. The vessel was released as a matter of courtesy with the understanding that this action should not serve as a precedent to determine the rights of the question at issue. The case is one of the most interesting that has ever occurred and the international jurist cannot help hoping that the parties may later have occasion to argue out the legal principles involved.

M. Fauchille's collection is not free from the sad chronicle of violations of the laws of war. The dropping of bombs on hospitals, the shooting of the wounded, the sinking of hospital ships, and the deportation of noncombatants, men and women, are made the subject of official protest. In the midst of all these horrors we find the constructive agreement of the eight Allies at the Paris Conference of March 28, 1916, supplemented by other articles adopted by the same powers at the Economic Conference held June 17, 1916. In all the excitement of a great war we are apt to forget the significance of these agreements which aim to make a strong commercial political union against Germany even after the cessation of hostilities. Does it mean that out of the common fear and distress the allied nations have taken the next great forward step on the path of state building?

ELLERY C. STOWELL.

My Four Years in Germany. By JAMES W. GERARD, Late Ambassador to the German Imperial Court. (New York: George H. Doran Company. 1917. Pp. 448. \$2.00.)

THIS book, advertised on the cover as "the most important contribution to the literature of great present-day events", is certainly a fitting sequel to *Germany before the War* by Baron Beyens, and if the latter work is more profound, the Belgian minister had enjoyed a long experience of European politics which the American ambassador lacked. As it is, Mr. Gerard had drawn freely on the contents of the black bag which he guarded so carefully on his journey from Berlin; he ventures no new interpretations, but he adduces many new facts and confirms many suspicions.

Undoubtedly the most important feature is the account of an interview with Bethmann-Hollweg in January, 1917, anent the terms of peace about which Germany had prated so much. Here at last is a definite and authentic statement of German "war aims": evacuation of Belgium—"with guarantees", "rectifications of frontier" east and west, a Teutonic solution of the Balkan problem, the return of colonies and ships, indemnities from all countries (pp. 365-366).

The opening chapters are disappointing, filled as they are with what Mr. Gerard himself calls "details of court life . . . very frivolous and far away" (p. 31) or with superficial analyses of the German constitution and German political parties. But one must remember that the author has written for a large audience—the book has run serially in at least three metropolitan newspapers—with the object of bringing home to the American people the "real Germany" (p. xii) and the temper of our enemy. From this point of view, Mr. Gerard's light treatment is quite justified, as are also the journalistic, popular style, the frequent use of the personal pronoun, and perhaps even the reproductions of court invitations. For such a presentation will appeal to millions who would ignore a more formidable treatise. The reviewer is inclined to believe that for the masses of our people the book will be distinctly informing. The account of the Zabern affair is one of the best hitherto printed in English, while the chapter on "The System" explains in admirable fashion the under-surface methods by which autocracy retains its grip on the German people.

Mr. Gerard makes several contributions to the chain of evidence that Germany had prepared for war in 1914. Zabern, he says, "greatly incensed the Emperor, and I believe, did much to win his consent to the war" (p. 91), driven on as he was by the Crown Prince, who had remarked that "when he came to the throne, there would be war, if not before, just for the fun of it" (p. 96). And Mr. Gerard believes that "a certain line of action had been agreed upon" before the Emperor went to Norway (p. 129). Corroborating this is the remark let fall by Prince Henry at a dinner given to the British fleet visiting Kiel in June: "We are sorry you are going, and we are sorry you came" (p. 107). The Emperor himself said on August 10: "The English change the whole situation—an obstinate nation—they will keep up the war. It cannot end soon" (p. 206). Jagow rejected Secretary Bryan's peace treaty for the same reason that he advanced to Sir Edward Goschen against respecting the neutrality of Belgium: "Germany would be deprived of her greatest asset in war, namely her readiness for a sudden and overpowering attack" (p. 61). A letter sent by Mr. Gerard to the chancellor on July 31, offering the mediation of America in the interests of peace, "never produced any reply" (p. 132). Prince Lichnowsky is twice quoted (pp. 100, 102) as reporting to Berlin that Great Britain did not desire war.

In the matter of German-American relations, Mr. Gerard seems to believe that in the spring of 1914 Germany proposed to Great Britain an intervention in Mexico (p. 59), and he adverts several times to the rôle which Germany expected Japan to play. In all his negotiations over problems raised by the war, the ambassador was handicapped by the unassailable conviction of the German authorities that America would not fight, an attitude for which Mr. Gerard holds the Americans in Germany and the vociferous German-Americans in this country pri-

marily responsible. The presidential campaign was also interpreted to mean that the United States was bent on peace at any price. Very interesting is the revelation that during the long submarine negotiations Germany several times proposed the marking of American vessels and that President Wilson always refused such overtures (pp. 234, 239): which raises serious doubt whether the German government was sincere in its final proposal to that effect on January 31, 1917. Indeed Mr. Gerard leaves no doubt of German bad faith in general: an American passport taken up for *visé* was not returned and was used by a spy shot in London (p. 152); the ambassador was ultimately prevented from visiting British prisoners in spite of the Anglo-German agreement (pp. 195-196); Zimmermann denied on January 6, 1917, that unrestricted submarine warfare would be resumed (p. 364); Bethmann-Hollweg declared that the resumption was occasioned by President Wilson's address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, whereas the Zimmermann note to Mexico had been despatched three days before (p. 370); and all the while that Germany was asserting in America her desire to avoid hostilities, at home a violent propaganda was being conducted against the United States by the Foreign Office through the "League of Truth", which indulged in base slander and open lies (p. 309 ff). Mr. Gerard has set his story in an admirable perspective, for which both the patriot and the historian will be grateful. It was likewise well to record the remark of the Emperor on May 1, 1916, that "there was no longer any international law, to [which] statement the chancellor agreed" (p. 340).

Mr. Gerard holds out little hope of a revolution in Germany. The agrarians are really anxious to continue the war because they can secure the labor of prisoners at nominal wages and are making enormous profits (pp. 191-192). The liberal element, no inconsiderable body (ch. XVIII.), is helpless before the military, as indeed are the civil authorities from the chancellor down. The deportations from Lille, Turcoing, and Roubaix were ordered without the knowledge of Bethmann-Hollweg, who promised Mr. Gerard to speak to the emperor about them (p. 334). Bethmann was also anxious to avoid a rupture with the United States, and Zimmermann for all his swagger—in January, 1916, he declared that Germany was ready for war with the United States (p. 244) and a year later that America would not fight (p. 376)—was distinctly unhappy when Mr. Gerard demanded his passports (p. 377). Yet such was their "sheer weakness" (p. 357) that they could not secure Mr. Gerard an interview with Hindenburg and Ludendorff (p. 359). There is a tragic picture of the emperor, almost as helpless as his chancellor, and apparently opposed to excesses; at least "he said that he would not have permitted the sinking of the *Lusitania* if he had known" (p. 252), and he is believed to have warned the submarine commanders, in February, 1916, to be "careful" (p. 245). One hopeful note is sounded in the statement that the Belgian deportations were ordered because Ludendorff feared the British would break through and the general staff did not relish retreating through a hostile population (p. 351).

Unfortunately the mechanics of the book are poorly handled. The discussion of German institutions and politics should have been continuous, instead of being separated in chapters II., IV., and X. The account of prisoners of war, excellent in itself, need not have come before the chapter on the political and diplomatic problems of the first days of the war. The division of the topic of German-American relations into the twelfth and seventeenth chapters, in the midst of the *Sussex* negotiations, is decidedly irritating. The same fault is sometimes noticeable in a single chapter, or matter properly belonging in one chapter is introduced in a later one. The proof-reading is careless. "Polo de Bernabe" (pp. 35, 382), "Kaiserhoff" (p. 183), "Pascha" (p. 35), and "Sverbeeu" (p. 35) are not worthy of so accomplished a linguist as Mr. Gerard. "Arch Duke" (p. 106) and "motor men" (p. 409) are properly written as single words. "Grey" is a curious slip for "Goschen" (p. 132). "Slavish" (p. 55) is a dubious substitute for "Slavic".

Certain errors may be noted. There is no imperial minister for education (p. 41); the deputies of Alsace-Lorraine were admitted to the Reichstag in 1874, not in 1871 (p. 79); Sadowa was fought nearly four, not two weeks (p. 101) after the rupture between Austria and Prussia. *Kriegsgefahrzustand*, not *Kriegszustand*, was proclaimed on July 31, 1914 (p. 403). Mr. Gerard overstates the anti-monarchical sentiments of the Socialists (pp. 45, 394), for only a quarter of the Socialist vote came from avowed Socialists, and if the word "republic" has recently been uttered by a Minority Socialist, the Majority have stood manfully by the emperor. "It is hard to conceive that Poland was at one time perhaps the most powerful kingdom in Europe" (p. 49). It is indeed. Surely it is too much to say that "the whole world honours Bethmann-Hollweg for his honesty" (p. 400). Has Mr. Gerard forgotten that speech in which the chancellor admitted that the pledges to the United States were given only because the time was not then propitious for resuming unrestricted submarine warfare?

In spite, however, of these blemishes, every American will read this book with satisfaction. For there will subsist no doubt that Mr. Gerard left no stone unturned to preserve peace or that he did not keep the German government accurately informed of the truth about America. Granted that his methods were sometimes bizarre and his language unconventional, it is clear that they often secured his ends when other means had failed and that, in all probability, no kind of diplomacy could have saved the situation.

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